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1061 
THE DE MINIMIS DEFENSE IN SOUND RECORDINGS: HOW A 
TRIVIAL CLAIM LEADS TO A BIG QUESTION 
Elvin Canario* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With regard to copyright, James Madison said in 1788 “[t]he 
utility of this power will scarcely be questioned.”1  If here today, it is 
safe to say, Madison would be shocked at the number of controversies 
and questions surrounding this “power.”  With the emergence of 
technology, these controversies have only become more convoluted.2  
For example, courts have conflicting viewpoints on what rights are 
protected by copyright.3  It was not until the 1970s that sound 
recordings were brought into the ambit of copyright protections.4  
Since then, there has been, and continues to be, much debate in this 
area of law.5  Copyright law surrounding sound recordings has become 
more relevant because of advancements and progressions in musical 
technology.  This musical technology now permits sounds to be copied 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2020, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.A. in Political 
Science, Cum Laude, Stony Brook University, 2016.  First and foremost, I would like to thank 
God.  I would also like to thank my wonderful family who give me my motivation to keep 
trying my hardest every day.  Finally, I would like to thank the remarkable personnel of Touro 
Law, from our professors to our Law Review staff, to just speaking with friends before class; 
everyone here has, in some way, helped to contribute to the accomplishment of this Note. 
1 James Madison, Federalist, No. 43, 288, FOUNDERS CONST., Jan. 23, 1788, http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s7.html. 
2 Nicole Lieberman, Un-Blurring Substantial Similarity: Aesthetic Judgments and 
Romantic Authorship in Music Copyright Law, 6 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 91, 125 
(2016). 
3 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005); VMG Salsoul, 
LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016). 
4 Lieberman, supra note 2, at 99. 
5 See generally Marsha A. Willis, Unauthorized Digital Sound Sampling, the Taking of a 
Constitutional Right, 17 S.U. L. REV. 309 (1990). 
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and replayed at the push of a button, allowing for many songs and other 
sounds that musicians or producers have created to easily be pirated.6   
Regarding copyright protection of sound recordings, questions 
remain as to the defenses that are available to alleged infringers when 
“sampling” technology is used.7  The sound recording industry defines 
sampling as, “taking a snippet of a song and repurposing it.”8  After a 
plaintiff establishes the initial burden of proving an actual copying of 
his work,9 the applicable defenses differ depending on the federal 
district court in which the suit is brought.10  If a court was in a district 
that adopts the bright-line rule, which says that any form of conceded-
to copying of a sound recording requires a license, then fair use will 
arguably be the only viable defense.11  However, if the suit is brought 
in a district which has considered certain types of sampling trivial, then 
the de minimis defense will be available.12 
This Note explores the idea that courts should apply the bright-
line rule,13 allowing for fair use14 as the only reasonable defense for 
conceded-to sampling of sound recordings, until Congress takes an 
alternative approach.  Section II provides definitions and history of key 
terms and laws that will be used throughout this Note.  Section III 
explains the position of the Sixth Circuit, which generally finds that 
samplers of sound recordings should not be allowed to use the de 
minimis defense.  Contrarily, Section IV discusses the Ninth Circuit’s 
analysis in favor of such a defense.  Section V discusses possible 
unforeseen complications that a de minimis exception for sampling 
 
6 See Bruce J. McGiverin, Digital Sound Sampling, Copyright and Publicity: Protecting 
Against the Electronic Appropriation of Sounds, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1723, 1723 (1987) 
(“digital sound sampling[‘s] . . . current use in the music industry poses a threat both to the 
value of musicians’ recorded work and to their professional identities.”). 
7 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 792; see also VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 871. 
8 Digital Music Sampling: Creativity or Criminality?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, INC., (Jan. 28, 
2011, 1:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/01/28/133306353/Digital-Music-Sampling-
Creativity-Or-Criminality. 
9 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
10 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 792; see also VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 871. 
11 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805 (“These conclusions require us to reverse the entry of 
summary judgment entered . . . . Since the district judge found no infringement, there was no 
necessity to consider the affirmative defense of ‘fair use.’  On remand, the trial judge is free 
to consider this defense and we express no opinion on its applicability to these facts.”). 
12 See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 871 (allowing the de minimis defense in sound recording 
infringement cases). 
13 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 792. 
14 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). 
2
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could bring about.  Section V finishes with some possible resolutions 
that courts could use until the circuit split is resolved.   
II. HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT AND RELEVANT DEFINITIONS 
Copyright protections are derived directly from the United 
States Constitution.15  As indicated in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of 
the Constitution, the purpose of copyright law is “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”16  Accordingly, it is clear that Congress takes into 
account two factors when legislating copyright law: (1) protecting 
original works and (2) avoiding the stifling of creativity.17  The 
Founding Fathers believed that creating laws that would punish people 
for the unauthorized copying of another’s work would serve as a 
deterrent and allow a creator to have assurances that his works would 
not be stolen, which provides him with a limited monopoly to his 
work.18  However, under narrow circumstances, unauthorized users of 
the copyrighted work can use the work without legal implications by 
arguing that such use was fair, which stems back to the common law 
and is now codified.19  The purpose of this fair use defense was and 
continues to be to prevent overprotection of copyrights, encompassing 
the idea that not allowing anyone to use any work for any purpose goes 
against the very reason why Congress created the copyright laws with 
its legislative power granted by the Constitution.20  
 
15 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
16 Id. 
17 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800. 
18 See Copyright Timeline: A History of Copyright in the United States, ASS’N RES. LIBR., 
http://www.arl.org/focus-areas/copyright-ip/2486-copyright-timeline#.WsFFpojwbIU (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2018) (“The law was meant to provide an incentive to authors, artists, and 
scientists to create original works by providing creators with a monopoly.”). 
19 See Martine Courant Rife, The Fair Use Doctrine: History, Application, and Implications 
for (New Media) Writing Teachers, 24 COMPUTERS & COMPOSITIONS 154, 158 (2007), 
https://msu.edu/~mcgrat71/Writing/Fair_Use_Rife.pdf (“Section 107, as part of the 1976 
Copyright Act, defines fair use and sets forth what is commonly known as the four-factor test.  
Previous to this legislation, fair use was not clearly defined in any code—but was defined 
through extrapolating holdings and discussions in U.S. Case Law . . . .”); see also Campbell 
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 
(2d Cir. 2015) 
20 Cf. Fair Use, STAN. U. LIBR., https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/fair-use/ (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2018) (“Fair use is a copyright principle based on the belief that the public is entitled 
to freely use portions of copyrighted materials for purposes of commentary and criticism.  For 
3
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The United States Supreme Court has established a two-part 
test to determine whether copyright infringement has occurred.  The 
test includes: (1) establishment of ownership of a valid copyright, and 
(2) the copying of constituent elements of the work that are considered 
to be original to the copyright holder.21  If there is no direct evidence 
of copying, the plaintiff can prove the second element through 
circumstantial evidence by a showing of substantial similarity between 
the two works at issue.22   
The copyright law for sound recordings is a relatively new area 
in the field of copyright, the protections of such sound recordings 
becoming codified in the 1970s.23  17 U.S.C. § 114 specifically 
provides for copyright protections of sound recordings.  17 U.S.C. § 
114(b) provides for the exclusive rights and limitations given to 
copyright holders of sound recordings.24  The disagreements between 
 
example, if you wish to criticize a novelist, you should have the freedom to quote a portion of 
the novelist’s work without asking permission.  Absent this freedom, copyright owners could 
stifle any negative comments about their work.”); see also ALAN LATMAN, 12 NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT I (1958). 
21 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
22 Unicolors, Inc. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 853 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 2017). 
23 Lieberman, supra note 2, at 99.  For background on why sound recordings were not 
protected until this time, see infra text accompanying notes 86-94. 
24 17 U.S.C. § 114 provides: 
(a) The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording 
are limited to the rights specified by clauses (1), (2), (3) and (6) of section 
106, and do not include any right of performance under section 106(4).  
(b) The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording 
under clause (1) of section 106 is limited to the right to duplicate the sound 
recording in the form of phonorecords or copies that directly or indirectly 
recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording. The exclusive right of 
the owner of copyright in a sound recording under clause (2) of section 
106 is limited to the right to prepare a derivative work in which the actual 
sounds fixed in the sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise 
altered in sequence or quality. The exclusive rights of the owner of 
copyright in a sound recording under clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 do 
not extend to the making or duplication of another sound recording that 
consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though 
such sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording. 
The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under 
clauses (1), (2), and (3) of section 106 do not apply to sound recordings 
included in educational television and radio programs (as defined in 
section 397 of title 47) distributed or transmitted by or through public 
broadcasting entities (as defined by section 118(f)): Provided, That copies 
or phonorecords of said programs are not commercially distributed by or 
through public broadcasting entities to the general public. 
17 U.S.C. §114 (2018) (emphasis in original). 
4
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the Sixth and Ninth Circuits mainly revolve around this portion of the 
statute and its interpretations, particularly regarding the protections it 
affords artists using the sampling technique. 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines sampling as “[t]he process of 
taking a small portion of a sound recording and digitally manipulating 
it as part of a new recording.”25  Others have defined the technique a 
bit more passionately, as one author describes: 
To sample is to cut up: mine the archive; steal to 
subvert; recycle footage; assist a readymade; 
appropriate invention; elevate the fragment; drift 
though sequences of signs . . . question the act of 
watching . . . raise the dead . . . become a curator; open 
up the cultural database . . . eviscerate the author; 
materialize associative actions.26 
A person who engages in the process of sampling can achieve 
sampling through a variety of means;27 a common method used to 
sample is through a synthesizer.28  This process requires just the touch 
of a button to incorporate the sampled sound into the new work,29 
saving the sampler time and money of having to re-record a piece of 
music he wants to use.30  
Technological innovations eventually prompted Congress to 
make amendments to existing copyright law to give these new forms 
of intellectual property their own distinct protections.31  However, 
there are currently only two circuits courts that have addressed the 
issue of whether a sampler can use the de minimis doctrine as an 
 
25 Sampling, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
26 READINGS IN LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE 277 (Steve Greenfield & Guy Osborn eds., 
2006) (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
27 Francesco Di Cosmo, Return of the De Minimis Exception in Digital Music Sampling: 
The 9th Circuit’s Recent Holding in VMG Salsoul Improves Upon the 6th Circuit’s Holding 
in Bridgeport, But Raises Questions of its Own, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 227 (2017). 
28 McGiverin, supra note 6. 
29 McGiverin, supra note 6, at 1725. 
30 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 802 n.14 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(“Thus sampling of records . . . allows a producer of music to save money (by not hiring a 
musician) without sacrificing the sound and phrasing of a live musician in the song.”); see also 
id. at 802 n.7. 
31 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5660; 
see also Willis, supra note 5, at 323. 
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affirmative defense against infringement claims for sampled sound 
recordings.32   
De minimis is short for the Latin phrase de minimis non curat 
lex, which translates to “[t]he law does not concern itself with trifles.”33  
This doctrine holds that if a defendant can prove that the allegations or 
harms alleged by the plaintiff are trivial, this fact alone stands as an 
affirmative defense to the charge.34  Since the Supreme Court’s 
introduction of the de minimis standard in 1796,35 there are now many 
fields of law that apply this doctrine, such as taxation, labor unions, 
and voter disenfranchisement.36  The term de minimis was used in 
copyright disputes as early as 1847.37  In analyzing the de minimis 
standard in copyright law, the courts tend to focus on whether the 
copied portion was “substantial” enough to constitute actual copying 
of a protected work.38  Accordingly, the courts have found that the de 
minimis standard applied in cases involving the copying of 
 
32 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 792; VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 
2016).  Although no other circuit court has decided on this exact issue, there are courts that 
have made rulings on digital sampling, namely courts in the First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth 
Circuits.  See, e.g., Arista Records, LLC v. Does 1-27, No. 07-162-B-W, 2008 WL 222283, at 
*1 (D. Me. Jan. 25, 2008), aff’d, 584 F. Supp. 2d 240 (D. Me. 2008); Poindexter v. EMI Record 
Grp. Inc., No. 11 CIV. 559(LTS)(JLC), 2012 WL 1027639 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2012); 
Curington v. UMG Recordings, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-890, 2011 WL 3568278 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 
12, 2011), aff’d, 468 F. App’x 304 (4th Cir. 2012); Batiste v. Island Records Inc., 179 F.3d 
217 (5th Cir. 1999). 
33 De Minimis Non Curat Lex, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
34 Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1998) (“To establish 
that the infringement of a copyright is de minimis, and therefore not actionable, the alleged 
infringer must demonstrate that the copying of the protected material is so trivial as to fall 
below the quantitative threshold of substantial similarity, which is always a required element 
of actionable copying.” (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
35 Jeffrey Brown, How Much Is Too Much? The Application of the De Minimis Doctrine to 
the Fourth Amendment, 82 MISS. L.J. 1097, 1099 (2013). 
36 Id. at 1100-02. 
37 Webb v. Powers, 29 F. Cas. 511, 520 (C.C.D. Mass. 1847) (No. 17,323) (“A novelty in 
arrangement, especially so trifling as this, without any new material connected with it, seemed 
to him, and still seems to him to be, of questionable sufficiency to be protected by a copyright.  
The master seemed to be of the same opinion, on the ground ‘De minimis non curat lex.’  
Slight changes, like the use of chapters and verses, where none existed before, as some 
hundreds of years ago in the Bible, or the introduction of punctuation, which is said not now 
to exist generally in acts of parliament, or the use of sections instead of pages, which in modern 
times is reviving only an ancient practice, would all have higher claims to novelty and 
usefulness, than merely transferring the same material from one page at the end to another in 
the central part of a book, as here.”). 
38 See Sandoval, 147 F.3d at 215; see also Gottlieb Dev. LLC v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 
590 F. Supp. 2d 625 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 
(2d Cir. 1997); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 34 [2018], No. 4, Art. 13
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss4/13
2018 DE MINIMIS DEFENSE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 1067 
photographs,39 pinball machines40 in the background of movies, 
television programs41 and books; in each of these cases, the de minimis 
defense prevailed and, consequently, prevented recovery.42  
III. SAMPLING AND COPYRIGHT AS INTERPRETED BY THE SIXTH 
CIRCUIT 
The most prominent case stemming from the Sixth Circuit 
regarding sampling is Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films.43  In 
this case, the issue before the court was whether a three-note 
combination from a solo guitar, sampled from the sound recording 
“Get Off Your Ass and Jam,” constituted copyright infringement.44  
The sample was first inserted in the song “100 Miles and Runnin’,” 
which was subsequently included on the sound track of the defendant’s 
movie “I Got The Hook Up.”45  The district court undertook the de 
minimis analysis and determined that, although the defendant did not 
deny using the plaintiff’s sampled work, the portion was relatively 
unsubstantial and not enough to constitute infringement.46  However, 
the Sixth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court, determining 
that the district court’s analysis was erroneous.47  The Sixth Circuit 
held that, under its interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 114, a copyright holder 
is the only person that can legally sample from his work.  Thus, the de 
minimis inquiry is not necessary when a defendant has sampled a 
copyrighted sound recording because no amount of the work could 
legally be sampled without the copyright holder’s authorization.48  
With this holding, the Sixth Circuit created a bright-line rule by 
eliminating the de minimis inquiry49 for digital sampling of copyright 
protected sound recordings; if anyone wanted to sample any amount of 
a protected sound recording, he would need to get a license.50  The 
 
39 Sandoval, 147 F.3d at 215. 
40 Gottlieb, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 625. 
41 Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 70. 
42 Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 132. 
43 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). 
44 Id. at 795. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 797. 
47 Id. at 798. 
48 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801-02. 
49 And, thus, the de minimis defense. 
50 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801. 
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Sixth Circuit believed this new bright-line rule would clarify the 
judicial approach to cases involving sampling infringement.51  
A. The Sixth Circuit’s Statutory Interpretation of 17 
U.S.C. § 114(b) 
The Sixth Circuit did not analyze the statute’s legislative 
history because digital sampling had not yet been created when 
Congress enacted 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).52  Instead, the court did a “literal 
reading”53 of the statute and discussed why sound recordings needed 
their own copyright protections.54  The court first mentioned that 
Congress expressed a need to amend the statute because it wanted to 
prevent the pirating of sound recordings, which was increasing with 
technological advancements.55  The court then looked at the plain 
meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 114 (b) and determined that “the world at large 
is free to imitate or simulate the creative work fixed in the recording 
so long as an actual copy of the sound recording itself is not made.”56  
From this understanding, the court boiled down the question of 
sampling a sound recording to, “[i]f you cannot pirate the whole sound 
recording, can you ‘lift’ or ‘sample’ something less than the whole?”57  
The court held in the negative.58  
1. The Sixth Circuit’s Plain Meaning 
Interpretation of 17 U.S.C § 114(b) 
The Sixth Circuit in Bridgeport began its plain meaning 
analysis focusing on 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).59  It determined that the 
language of the statute gave the owner of a copyright the exclusive 
right to sample his own recording.60  The court held that sampling 
constituted a version of a derivative work61 and, because section 114(b) 
 
51 Id. at 799. 
52 See id. at 805. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 800. 





60 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801. 
61 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (“A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more 
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, 
8
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granted the exclusive right to prepare a derivative work, copyright 
holders had that same exclusive right in sampling their own work.62  
The Sixth Circuit based its decision on the fact that, prior to the 
amendments, the word “entirely” was not included in the language of 
the statute.63  An author creates a derivative work if the new work 
contains a sample from one of his original works, and because this new 
derivative work does not consist “entirely of independent fixation of 
other sounds,” his exclusive right to prepare such derivative works 
applies.64  
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that, because Congress explicitly 
inserted the word “entirely” into section 114(b), its intent was for 
future techniques, like sampling, to satisfy the requirement.65  Any 
amount of an author’s protected work that is incorporated into another 
work constitutes a derivative of the protected work and only the 
copyright holder is authorized to make such a work because he has the 
exclusive right to prepare derivative works of his sound recordings in 
accordance with the statute.66  Moreover, the Sixth Circuit reasoned 
that the reverse also holds true in which a copyright holder cannot 
extend his rights in a particular sound recording to a new work if the 
new work consisted “entirely” of other independent sounds.67  Without 
encompassing any of the actual fixed sounds from his original sound 
recording, the new work could not be considered a derivative and, thus, 
would not be protected.68  Further, the exclusive right to prepare 
derivative works applies to sampling because sampling is considered a 
derivative work when incorporating actual sounds from a protected 
work into a new work, and this new derivative work is not entirely 
 
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any 
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.  A work consisting of 
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, 
represent an original work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’”); Id. § 106(2) (2018) ( 
“Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive 
rights . . . to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.”). 
62 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800-01 n.10. 
63 Id. at 800-01 (“The significance of this provision is amplified by the fact that the 
Copyright Act of 1976 added the word ‘entirely’ to this language.  Compare Sound Recording 
Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (Oct. 15, 1971)”). 
64 See id. at 800-01 n.10 (first emphasis in original). 
65 See id. at 800-01. 
66 See id. 
67 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800. 
68 See id. at 800-01. 
9
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independent of actual protected sounds.69  Thus, the court held that “a 
sound recording owner has the exclusive right to ‘sample’ his own 
recoding.”70 
The Sixth Circuit’s determination that sampling constitutes an 
instance where sounds from a sound recording are either “rearranged, 
remixed or otherwise altered,”71 thus allowing for their protection 
under 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) as a derivative work,72 is supportable. 
Tunecore.com is a prominent website that deals with the licensing and 
the selling of music.73  In an article posted on its website, professor and 
former president of Rykodisc record label, George Howard, said: 
[B]ecause a sample is a derivative work, you cannot 
sample someone else’s copyrighted work without 
permission.  
Note that there are actually often two copyrights that 
must be addressed when a work is sampled (and thus 
two copyright holders you must get permission from in 
order to avoid infringing): 
The copyright to the song itself [and] the copyright to 
the version of the song (i.e. the master) 
… 
Should they not reject the request outright, they will 
negotiate with you to attempt to come to terms allowing 
your creation of a derivative work. Unlike mechanicals 
there’s no statutory maximum rate for samples, so 
publishers and master holders will get everything they 
can—including the rights to the copyright of the song 
that is using their sample—in the negotiations.  
A lesser-known approach to sampling is often referred 
to as a “replay.” This is where a derivative work is 
 
69 See id. at 800-01 n.10. 
70 Id. at 800-01 (emphasis added). 
71 See id. at 800-01 n.10; 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2018). 
72 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800-01 n.10; 17 U.S.C. § 114. 
73 Ogden Payne, What Tunecore’s $1B In Revenue Means For Independent Musicians 
Worldwide, FORBES (June 29, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ogdenpayne/ 
2017/06/29/what-tunecores-1b-in-revenue-means-for-independent-musicians-worldwide/#5b 
445e1460b0 (“TuneCore is nearing $1 billion in revenue for its artists.  As of May 31, artists 
and bands around the world have earned over $920 million collectively.  To reach their goal 
ahead of their projected date in October, the company has launched the Billion Dollar Club, a 
campaign that allows users to upload a single for worldwide distribution to over 160 digital 
stores (Spotify, Apple Music, Tidal and the like) for free, for a limited time.”). 
10
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created and used as part of another work via a re-
performance/re-recording of a piece of the original 
work. 
… 
It cuts both ways, of course, should someone want to 
sample your copyrighted work, he or she will have to 
negotiate a deal with you in order to do so, or risk you 
suing them for infringing upon your exclusive right to 
create derivative works.74 
The author then gives a warning against de minimis sampling 
stating, “[t]here is no clear standard for what is considered de minimis 
usage, and thus [a creator] is at risk if [he] misappropriate[s] any 
copyrighted material and create[s] a derivative work in the form of a 
sample in [his] own composition.”75  This determination by an 
influential voice in the industry supports the same finding by the Sixth 
Circuit in Bridgeport: sampling a sound recording creates a derivative 
work.  Therefore, creating a work that uses samples constitutes the 
making of a derivative work, which is a right that is only afforded to 
the copyright holder of the sound recording as per 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).76  
Lastly, in the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976, 
the House Judiciary Committee said that, “to constitute a violation of 
section 106(2),77 the infringing work must incorporate a portion of the 
copyrighted work in some form.”78  This language suggests that 
sampling would be a violation of the exclusive right to prepare a 
derivative work because the very meaning of sampling is to 
incorporate a portion of a copyrighted work, in some form, into a new 
work.  Perhaps the legislative history also supports the Sixth Circuit’s 
and music industries’ finding that sampling can and should be 
 
74 George Howard, Understanding Sampling, Cover Sounds & Derivative Work, TUNECORE 
(Oct. 7, 2010), https://ca.tunecore.com/blog/2010/10/understanding-sampling-cover-songs-
derivative-work.html (emphasis added). 
75 Id. (emphasis added) (“Don’t be confused with respect to misinformation regarding the 
right to use small amounts of another’s copyrighted work in your composition—i.e. a ‘short’ 
sample—without legal risk.”). 
76 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 792; see also 17 U.S.C. § 114(b). 
77 17 U.S.C § 106(2) (2010) (stating “to prepare derivative works based upon the 
copyrighted work”). 
78 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 62 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5675 
(emphasis added). 
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considered a derivative work and, as such, is worthy of the protections 
given to sound recording copyright holders under 17 U.S.C § 114 (b).79  
2. Piracy of Sound Recordings and How “de 
minimis” Sampling Could Contribute  
The Sixth Circuit in Bridgeport wrote: 
There are probably any number of reasons why the 
decision was made by Congress to treat a sound 
recording differently from a book even though both are 
the medium in which an original work is fixed rather 
than the creation itself. None the least of them certainly 
were advances in technology which made the 
“pirating” of sound recordings an easy task. The 
balance that was struck was to give sound recording 
copyright holders the exclusive right “to duplicate the 
sound recording in the form of phonorecords or copies 
that directly or indirectly recapture the actual sounds 
fixed in the recording.” 17 U.S.C. § 114(b). . . . If you 
cannot pirate the whole sound recording, can you “lift” 
or “sample” something less than the whole.80 
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that Congress enacted 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) 
to curtail pirating, or copying, of small portions of a whole sound 
recordings.81 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines piracy as “[t]he unauthorized 
and illegal reproduction or distribution of materials protected by 
copyright.”82  It was argued in an article,83 relied upon by the court in 
Bridgeport, that unauthorized sampling falls under piracy law.84  The 
author cited to testimony of a representative of the Recording Industry 
 
79 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 792; Howard, supra note 74; but see Jennifer R. R. Mueller, All 
Mixed Up: Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films and De Minimis Digital Sampling, 81 IND. 
L.J. 435, 451 (2006) (“Thus, ‘sampling’ could almost never create a derivative work.”). 
80 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800 (emphasis added). 
81 See id. 
82 Piracy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
83 Jeffrey R. Houle, Digital Audio Sampling, Copyright Law and the American Music 
Industry: Piracy or Just A Bad “Rap”?, 37 LOY. L. REV. 879 (1992). 
84 Id. at 896-97; Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801 n.13; see also VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 
824 F.3d 871, 889 (9th Cir. 2016) (Silverman, J., dissenting) (“[T]he very nature of digital 
sampling makes a de minimis analysis inapplicable, since sampling or pirating necessarily 
involves copying a fixed performance.” (emphasis added)). 
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Association of America, given before a Senate committee, in which 
the representative explained how digital sampling was cutting into 
sales, employees were not paid, and investments and jobs would be at 
risk.85  Piracy in sound recordings has been, and is still, an acute 
problem in this country.  The author of this Note argues that use of the 
de minimis defense in digital sampling cases can actually contribute to 
the problem of sound recording piracy. 
Piracy has long been a problem in copyright, but it was not until 
the 1970s that Congress codified protection for sound recordings.86  In 
the legislative history for Public Law 92-140, which created the limited 
copyright in sound recording,87 Congress explicitly reported on the 
need for reform because pirates were exploiting a loophole in the 
current law.88  The pre-1971 law only protected the owners of 
copyright in musical works and not sound recordings, “as a result, [if 
record pirates could] satisfy the claim of the owner of the musical 
copyright,” they would then be able to pirate the sound recordings of 
musical compositions or other  protected sounds, without violating 
federal copyright law.89  Congress went on to say that copying of 
sounding recordings was becoming widespread and intolerable, further 
indicating that the piracy activity in this area was at an annual volume 
in excess of $100 million.90  Moreover, Congress indicated that sound 
recording piracy was negatively affecting the incomes of three 
groups91 by: (1) “depriving legitimate manufacturers of substantial 
income;”92 (2) “denying preforming artists and musicians of royalties 
and contributions to pension and welfare funds;”93 which had the effect 
of causing (3) “Federal and State governments [to lose] tax 
revenues.”94  
Looking at more contemporary numbers of the economic 
damage caused by sound recording, one can better understand why 
 
85 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801 n.13; Houle, supra note 83, at 896-97. 
86 Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (“To amend title 
17 of the United States Code to provide for the creation of a limited copyright in sound 
recordings for the purpose of protecting against unauthorized duplication and piracy of sound 
recording, and for other purposes.”). 
87 Id. 
88 See H.R. REP. NO. 92-487 (1971), as reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1567. 
89 See id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. (emphasis added). 
93 H.R. REP. NO. 92-487 (emphasis added). 
94 Id. 
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Congress passed the law in 1971.  Even today, Congress’s intuition 
about the need to prevent sound recording piracy as much as possible 
continues to be warranted.  In 2007, a published report presented the 
horrific problem of sound recording piracy.95  The report stated: 
The true cost of sound recording piracy far exceeds its 
impact on U.S. producers and distributors of sound 
recordings. Piracy harms not only the owners of 
intellectual property but also U.S. consumers and 
taxpayers.  
Specifically, the analysis demonstrates that:  
(a) As a consequence of global and U.S.-based 
piracy of sound recordings, the U.S. economy 
loses $12.5 billion in total output annually. 
Output includes revenue and related measures 
of economic performance. 
(b) As a result of sound recording piracy, the 
U.S. economy loses 71,060 jobs. Of this 
amount, 26,860 jobs would have been added in 
the sound recording industry or in downstream 
retail industries, while 44,200 jobs would have 
been added in other U.S. industries.  
(c) Because of sound recording piracy, U.S. 
workers lose $2.7 billion in earnings annually. 
Of this total, $1.1 billion would have been 
earned by workers in the sound recording 
industry or in downstream retail industries 
while $1.6 billion would have been earned by 
workers in other U.S. industries.  
(d) As a consequence of piracy, U.S. federal, 
state and local governments lose a minimum of 
$422 million in tax revenues annually. Of this 
amount, $291 million represents lost personal 
income taxes while $131 million is lost 
corporate income and production taxes.  
 
95 Stephen E. Siwek, The True Cost of Sound Recording Piracy to the U.S. Economy, INST. 
FOR POL’Y INNOVATION, at i, Aug. 2007, http://www.ipi.org/docLib/20120515_SoundRecord 
ingPiracy.pdf. 
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As policy makers turn their attention to the viability of 
the U.S. economy in the global marketplace, it seems 
obvious that the problem of music piracy should be 
afforded a high place on the policy agenda in coming 
years.96 
These numbers suggest that the current laws are still unable to 
fully handle the piracy issue.  Consequently, the Sixth Circuit’s ruling 
against de minimis sampling suggests that it did not want to exacerbate 
these economic losses.  As the court later noted, “[t]o properly sort out 
this type of problem with its complex technical and business overtones, 
one needs the type of investigative resources as well as the ability to 
hold hearings that is possessed by Congress.”97  Thus, with the current 
state of the law, if courts have difficulty deciding whether a sample is 
truly an infringement because of the complexities involved in making 
such a determination, then courts should not allow small or de minimis 
amounts of conceded-to sampling.  The statistics above show that 
piracy of sound recordings imposes significant costs on the United 
States economy and provides a strong reason for stricter laws for sound 
recordings.98 
Finally, the author of this Note does not oppose the use of 
sampling but rather advocates for uniform, applicable laws.  In fact, it 
has been the opinion of experts in the field that “the industry can 
potentially reverse the effects of online audio piracy by providing more 
legal and efficient sampling techniques that consumers could use.”99  
Therefore, if courts give copyright holders more protections, and 
provide legal clarity to creators seeking to sample by the 
implementation of such bright-line rules, such as the one created in 
Bridgeport,100 courts may be able to prevent and reverse the effects of 
sound recording/sampling piracy, which comports with Congress’s 
goal of battling piracy in sound recordings.101  
 
96 Id. 
97 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 805 (6th Cir. 2005). 
98 See Siwek, supra note 95, at 7 (“The physical piracy loss estimate begins with the U.S. 
losses from physical piracy that occur within the United States.  As shown in Table 3, this 
value is $335 million as per IFPI.”). 
99 Rebuttal Expert Report of Dr. Stan J. Liebowitz, Arista Records, LLC v. Lime Wire, 
LLC, 2010 WL 8510302 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.14, 2010) (No. 106CV05936) (first emphasis in 
original). 
100 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 802. 
101 H.R. REP. NO. 92-487 (1971), as reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1567. 
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The Sixth Circuit, after its legislative intent and plain meaning 
analysis of 17 U.S.C. § 114, next analyzed the substantial similarity 
inquiry and its application to the sampling of sound recordings.  It 
explained why this was the wrong test to apply to an infringement case 
dealing with the sampling of a sound recording, notwithstanding the 
occurrence of a substantial similarity finding for other certain types of 
copyright cases, such as musical compositions.102 
B. The Substantial Similarity or de minimis Inquiry: 
Not the Proper Test   
In cases where a defendant admits to the copying of the 
protected work but claims what was taken is so trivial that it should not 
be actionable, the courts will engage in a de minimis inquiry, by using 
the substantial similarity test, to determine if infringement has 
occurred.103  The ordinary observer, or average audience, version104 of 
 
102 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801-02. 
103 See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘[A] taking is considered 
de minimis only if it is so meager and fragmentary that the average audience would not 
recognize the appropriation.’ This observation reflects the relationship between the de minimis 
maxim and the general test for substantial similarity, which also looks to the response of the 
average audience, or ordinary observer, to determine whether a use is infringing” (citations 
omitted)).  Courts will also use the substantial similarity test to inquiry if a purported 
infringement is de minimis even if there has been no admission to infringement.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 191-94. 
104 The substantial similarity inquiry has long been established in copyright and scholars 
have identified at least three different versions of the test.  See Gabriel Godoy-Dalmau, 
Substantial Similarity: Kohus Got it Right, 6 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 231, 
243 (2017) (“Scholars have identified three discrete tests for substantial similarity in the U.S.: 
the ordinary observer test, the extrinsic/intrinsic test, and the abstraction-filtration-comparison 
test.”); see also Matthews v. Freedman, 157 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1998) (“Courts have used 
various formulas to isolate the protectible expression in the copyrighted work to determine 
whether the alleged infringing work is ‘substantially similar’ to that protectible expression”).  
Because the average audience test is the crux of the versions utilized by both the Sixth and 
Ninth Circuits, the use of term “de minimis inquiry” or “substantial similarity test” throughout 
this Note refers to this version of the substantial similarity test.  See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 
801 n.10; see also VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2016); Mueller, 
supra note 79, at 442 (“As the term ‘substantial similarity’ implies, the two works at issue 
need not be identical.  The most commonly articulated test looks at each work as a whole, and 
considers ‘whether an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been 
appropriated from the copyrighted work.’”); Mueller, supra note 79, at 442 n.62 (“The D.C., 
First, Second, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits all apply the “average audience” 
test in all cases. . . . The Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits use a “specialized audience” test in 
cases regarding complex and technical works.”); Lieberman, supra note 2, at 114 (“Much like 
the Second Circuit’s ordinary observer test, the [Ninth Circuit’s] intrinsic test is entirely 
subjective and based on the ‘response of the ordinary reasonable person’ to the ‘total concept 
and feel’ of a work, excluding expert testimony and dissection.” (footnote omitted)). 
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the test asks “whether a [reasonable] lay observer would consider the 
works as a whole substantially similar to one another.”105  Under this 
version, in cases involving music, this is accomplished by listening to 
both works in contention, and then asking if the factfinder could 
definitively hear or notice the alleged appropriation.106  If the 
appropriation cannot be recognized as originating from its alleged 
source, then the copying element has not been satisfied, and the case 
will not move forward.107 
The court in Bridgeport determined, “[t]he analysis that is 
appropriate for determining infringement of a musical composition 
copyright, is not the analysis that is to be applied to determine 
infringement of a sound recording.”108  The Sixth Circuit rejected the 
lower court’s application of the substantial similarity test to a sound 
recording because it was based on case law that used this test for 
musical compositions.109  The Sixth Circuit provided two reasons why 
a substantial similarity or de minimis inquiry should not “enter the 
equation”110 in cases of sampling a sound recording.  The first was 
based on its interpretation of the statute’s plain meaning.111  The court 
determined that this test had no application because determining if the 
sampling was similar or substantial was irrelevant.112  This is because 
 
105 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 275 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(“However, as have several of our sister circuits, we have also noted that it is appropriate to 
modify this inquiry for situations in which a smaller fragment of a work has been copied 
literally, but not the overall theme or concept—an approach referred to in the literature as 
‘fragmented literal similarity.’  See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][2] (rev. ed. 2009); see also Bridgeport, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 
F.3d 792, 797-98 (6th Cir. 2005) (recognizing the ‘fragmented literal similarity’ standard but 
declining to apply it in cases of digital sampling).”). 
106 See VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, No. CV 12-05967 BRO (CWx), 2013 WL 8600435, 
at *12 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013), judgment entered No. CV 12-05967 BRO (CWx), 2013 WL 
6983384 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016); 
see also Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 792 (6th Cir. 2005); 
Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004); Godoy-Dalmau, supra note 104, at 
243 (“The question is whether the defendant took enough of the plaintiff’s work such that an 
ordinary observer’s response to the work is to recognize that the defendant ‘appropriated 
something which belongs to the plaintiff.’”). 
107 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 792; see also Newton, 388 F.3d at 1193; Godoy-Dalmau, 
supra note 104, at 243. 
108 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 798. 
109 Id. (“Since the district court decision essentially tracked the analysis that is made if a 
musical composition copyright were at issue, we depart from that analysis.”). 
110 Id. at 801-02. 
111 See id. at 801. 
112 See id. 
17
Canario: De Minimis Defense in Copyright Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
1078 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
the only person that is authorized to make a sample or derivative work 
of a sound recording was the copyright holder, and, thus, only a 
determination of whether the copying was intentional needs to be 
explored—not whether an average audience could distinguish between 
what was copied.113  Second, courts relying on case law dealing with 
musical composition de minimis copying for analysis of sound 
recordings are mistaken because of the inherent differences between 
sound recordings and musical compositions. 114 
The court ended with noting that a bright-line rule would help 
the courts, as well as the music industry as a whole, by reducing the 
unpredictability in piracy law for issues of undisputed, unauthorized 
sampling of sound recordings.115  Moreover, courts, copyright holders, 
and creators would all benefit from a bright-line rule because of the 
difficulties and complexity with having to apply the “lay observer” 
test.116  
1. Sound Recordings Versus Musical 
Compositions  
The Sixth Circuit determined that, although the substantial 
similarity test is used for musical compositions, this same test should 
not also be applied to sound recordings.117  The court held that sound 
recording copyright holders seek protection of the actual sounds fixed 
in their given medium, not the song or underlying musical 
composition.118  The copyright holders of each work have distinct 
interests, notwithstanding a musical composition’s overlap with a 
sound recording in the same piece of work.119   
 
113 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801. 
114 See id. at 801-02. 
115 Id. at 802 n.15. 
116 See id. (“This case also illustrates the kind of mental, musicological, and technological 
gymnastics that would have to be employed if one were to adopt a de minimis or substantial 
similarity analysis.  The district judge did an excellent job of navigating these troubled waters, 
but not without dint of great effort.  When one considers that he has hundreds of other cases 
all involving different samples from different songs, the value of a principled bright-line rule 
becomes apparent.  We would want to emphasize, however, that considerations of judicial 
economy are not what drives this opinion.  If any consideration of economy is involved it is 
that of the music industry.  As this case and other companion cases make clear, it would appear 
to be cheaper to license than to litigate.” (emphasis in original)). 
117 See id. at 798. 
118 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 802 (“For the sound recording copyright holder, it is not the 
‘song’ but the sounds that are fixed in the medium of his choice.”). 
119 See id. 
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Sound recordings are unique because they capture the musical 
composition with all the nuances.  An artist adds his own style and 
variations, or “performance elements,” while creating a sound 
recording from a musical composition.120  As a result, these 
performance elements are captured and are copyrighted in the sound 
recording.121  The United States Copyright Office explains the 
difference as: 
Sound recordings often contain other separate 
copyrightable creative works, such as songs, plays, 
lectures, or readings. The copyright in a sound 
recording covers the recording itself. It does not cover 
the music, lyrics, words, or other underlying content 
embodied in that recording. . . . The underlying music 
and lyrics are a “musical work,” and a recording of an 
artist performing that song is a “sound recording.”122 
Moreover, the court in T.B. Harms Co. v. Jem Records, Inc.123 further 
distinguished the two types of works, saying that “[a] sound recording 
as copyrightable subject matter must be distinguished from the 
copyrighted literary, musical or dramatic work . . . . The sound 
recording is the aggregation of sounds captured in the recording while 
the song or tangible medium of expression embodied in the recording 
is the musical composition.”124  Also, the Southern District of New 
York, in Poindexter v. EMI,125 mentioned that the unique elements in 
a sound recording must be distinguished from the underlying 
compositional elements.126   
 
120 See BTE v. Bonnecaze, 43 F. Supp. 2d 619, 627-28 (E.D. La. 1999) (citing T.B. Harms 
Co. v. Jem Records, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1575, 1577 n.1 (D.N.J. 1987)); see also Newton v. 
Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[R]egardless of whether the average audience 
might recognize the ‘Newton technique’ at work in the sampled sound recording, those 
performance elements are beyond consideration in Newton’s claim for infringement of his 
copyright in the underlying composition.”). 
121 See BTE, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 627 (citing T.B. Harms Co., 655 F. Supp. at 1576 n.1) (“The 
sound recording is the aggregation of sounds captured in the recording while the song or 
tangible medium of expression embodied in the recording is the musical composition.”). 
122 Copyright Registration for Sound Recordings, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., at 2, Sept. 2017, 
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ56.pdf. 
123 T.B. Harms Co., 655 F. Supp. at 1575. 
124 Id. at 1576 n.1.  See also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5669. (emphasis added). 
125 No. 11 CIV. 559 LTS JLC, 2012 WL 1027639, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2012). 
126 See id. (“[A] Court must filter out the elements unique to the sound recording and 
consider only the . . . compositional elements.”). 
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Because of this interest in the actual fixed sounds, as opposed 
to notes from a musical composition, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that 
“even when a small part of a sound recording is sampled, the part [or 
sound] taken is something of value.”127  Thus, sampling any portion of 
a sound recording would constitute a “physical taking” of the interest 
in the copyright holder, versus an intellectual taking, as would be for 
musical composition copyright holders.128  The court found that no 
matter the amount, if a creator of a sound recording sampled a portion 
of another protected sound recording, to either “save cost or . . . add 
something new to the new recording, or . . . both,”129 something of 
value was lifted from the copyright holder’s interest.  Therefore, only 
an inquiry as to whether such sampling had, in fact, occurred needs to 
be undertaken to establish infringement.130   
Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the de minimis inquiry 
is not appropriate to use in cases of sampling sound recordings based 
on its interpretation of the 17 U.S.C. § 114(b), and, therefore, the court 
determined that sound recording copyright holders and musical 
composition copyright holders require different protections.131  This 
decision governed the Sixth Circuit and remained unchallenged by any 
 
127 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801-02 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(“This analysis admittedly raises the question of why one should, without infringing, be able 
to take three notes from a musical composition, for example, but not three notes by way of 
sampling from a sound recording”). 
128 See id. at 802. 
129 Id. 
130 See id. 
131 Id. at 801-02. 
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other appellate circuit  court for  10 years,132 until the Ninth Circuit 
decided to take a different approach when faced with the same issue.133  
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT RULING IN VGM AND ITS 
CONSIDERATIONS 
In VGM Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone,134 the Ninth Circuit 
determined whether an alleged infringer who sampled from a 
copyright protected sound recording could use a de minimis defense.135  
 
132 Although unchallenged by another circuit court, the Bridgeport decision was strongly 
criticized by many commenters.  See, e.g., 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[2][b] (rev. ed. 2009) (“Indeed, had Bridgeport Music consulted Section 
114’s legislative history instead of dismissing that history as irrelevant, it would have 
discovered . . . [t]hat [an] excerpt [of legislative history] debunks the court’s imputation that 
Congress, when adopting Section 114, intended to dispense with traditional notions of 
substantial similarity. . . . Moreover, the very process by which Bridgeport Music expands the 
rights of copyright owners through construing Section 114 rests on a misapprehension of the 
statutory structure.”); 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PARTY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:61 (Sept. ed. 2018) (“A 
disturbing, inexplicable departure from the de minimis non curat lex doctrine occurred in the 
Sixth Circuit’s 2005 opinion in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films. . . . Other than 
Bridgeport and the district courts following that decision, we are aware of no case that the de 
minimis doctrine does not apply in a copyright infringement case.”); Jeffrey F. Kersting, 
Singing A Different Tune: Was the Sixth Circuit Justified in Changing the Protection of Sound 
Recordings in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 663, 684-85 
(2005) (“Finally, when statutory terms appear ambiguous, courts can generally turn to the 
legislative history for some assistance.  The Sixth Circuit did not address the legislative history 
of the Sound Recording Act of 1971 or the Copyright Act of 1976 at all . . . . The arbitrary 
nature of the substantial similarity and de minimis tests make them difficult to apply in 
virtually any context, but this difficulty does not justify absolute abandonment of the tests in 
this sub-group of [sound recording] cases.” (footnotes omitted)); Courtney Bartlett, Bridgeport 
Music’s Two-Second Sample Rule Puts the Big Chill on the Music Industry, 15 DEPAUL-LCA 
J. ART & ENT. L. 301, 324-26 (2005) (“While the Sixth Circuit’s decision provides increased 
protection for copyright holders, its effect on the music industry could be damaging because 
the creativity of musicians and producers might become increasingly discouraged . . . . The 
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Bridgeport Music has created another opportunity for a chilling 
effect in rap music.”); John Schietinger, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films: How the 
Sixth Circuit Missed A Beat on Digital Music Sampling, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 209, 230 (2005) 
(“The Sixth Circuit erred by crafting its bright-line rule and not permitting a de minimis 
analysis.  Three specific legal arguments illustrate why this was an error in the court’s opinion.  
First, a de minimis analysis applies to copyright infringement cases in general.  Second, neither 
sampling case law nor the Copyright Act eliminates the de minimis analysis for infringement 
cases involving the sound recording copyright.  Third, failing to conduct the de minimis 
analysis runs counter to the purposes of copyright law.” (footnotes omitted)). 
133 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 888 (9th Cir. 2016) (Silverman, J., 
dissenting) (“[A]n on-point decision of the Sixth Circuit, a decision that has governed the 
music industry in Nashville—’Music City’—and elsewhere for over a decade without causing 
either the sky to fall in, or Congress to step in.”). 
134 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016). 
135 Id. at 878. 
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In the early 1980s, music producer, Shep Pettibone, one of the 
defendants in the suit, recorded the song Ooh I love it (Love Break).136  
The musical composition and sound recording licenses of Love Break 
were subsequently acquired by the Plaintiff VGM Salsoul, LLC.137  
Then, in the early 1990s, well-known pop star and co-defendant, 
Madonna Loise Ciccone (commonly known as Madonna), released the 
song Vogue that achieved great commercial success.138  The plaintiff 
in the suit alleged that the producer of Vogue copied a 0.23 second 
“segment of horns,” or what became known as a “horn hit” by the 
court,139 from the Love Break song he had produced.140  However, the 
plaintiff claimed that this appropriation of the horn hit from Love Break 
into Vogue violated VGM’s copyright in Love Break because VGM 
was the owner of the copyright to the sound recording.141  The district 
court applied the de minimis analysis and concluded that even if the 
defendants conceded the copying,142 “no reasonable audience would 
find the sampled portions qualitatively or quantitively significant in 
relation to the infringing work, nor would they recognize the 
appropriation.”143  From this finding, the district court concluded that 
the appropriation of the horn hit was not actionable and, thus, granted 
summary judgement for the defendant.144 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the de minimis inquiry 
was correctly applied in determining infringement for both copying of 
a musical composition and sampling of a sound recording.145  As a 
result, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the holding of the lower court, 
finding that the sampling of the horn hit was de minimis and not 
 
136 Id. at 875. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 874. 
139 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 874-76. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 See VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, No. CV 12-05967 BRO (CWx), 2013 WL 8600435, 
at *12 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013), judgment entered No. CV 12-05967 BRO (CWx), 2013 WL 
6983384 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016); 
see also VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 877 (“Tony Shimkin has sworn that he, as Pettibone’s 
personal assistant, helped with the creation of Vogue and that, in Shimkin’s presence, 
Pettibone directed an engineer to introduce sounds from Love Break into the recording of 
Vogue.  Additionally, Plaintiff submitted reports from music experts who concluded that the 
horn hits in Vogue were sampled from Love Break. . . . Plaintiff has demonstrated actual 
copying.”). 
143 VMG Salsoul, 2013 WL 8600435, at *12. 
144 Id. 
145 See generally VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 871. 
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copyright infringement.146  Interpreting 17 U.S.C. § 114, the court 
concluded that Congress intended to maintain the de minimis exception 
for claims of infringement of sound recordings and found that the 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights in a sound recording did not 
necessarily extend to the making of another sound recording that used 
the protected work in its creation.147  With this holding, the Ninth 
Circuit took the “unusual step”148 of explicitly breaking with the only 
other circuit that had made an on-point ruling of this very question, the 
Sixth Circuit in Bridgeport.149 
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Rationale for the Application 
of the Substantial Similarity Inquiry to Sound 
Recordings 
The concept of a substantial similarity inquiry for determining 
copyright infringement was developed through common law.150  
Congress and the Supreme Court have been silent as to how this 
inquiry should be conducted,151 which has likely led to the different 
versions.152  As stated by an author on the subject:  
[T]he Copyright Act does not expressly reference the 
substantial similarity inquiry, Congress is aware that 
courts engage in the inquiry. Much of the legislative 
discussion, however, is limited to just that—
recognizing that there is such a thing as the substantial 
similarity inquiry. Congress has expressly deferred to 




147 See id. at 884-85 (“Accordingly, even though it is true that, ‘if the recording consists 
entirely of independent sounds, then the copyright does not extend to it,’ that statement does 
not necessarily mean that ‘if the recording does not consist entirely of independent sounds, 
then the copyright does extend to it.’”). 
148 Id. at 886. 
149 Id.; Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). 
150 Godoy-Dalmau, supra note 104, at 241-43 (“Congress and the Supreme Court have been 
silent on the matter, lower courts have largely been alone in developing tests to determine 
exactly when a work is sufficiently quantitatively or qualitatively similar.”). 
151 See Godoy-Dalmau, supra note 104, at 241-43. 
152 See generally Godoy-Dalmau, supra note 104, at 241-43. 
153 See Godoy-Dalmau, supra note 104, at 241-42. 
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The Ninth Circuit in VGM used the ordinary observer, or average 
audience, version of the substantial similarity test for its inquiry, just 
as the district court had done.154  This Note does not take issue with 
this longstanding inquiry155 but raises some questions about the Ninth 
Circuit’s rationale. 
The Ninth Circuit’s rationale for applying this test to sound 
recordings is problematic.  First, the Ninth Circuit said that only the 
performer’s contributions in a sound recording are used for 
determining copyright infringement, making no mention about the 
producer’s contributions.156  Second, the precedent used by the Ninth 
Circuit dealt with the de minimis doctrine regarding musical 
compositions, not sound recordings.157  Last, the Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that the average audience test was the correct test because it 
is the average audience or lay public that ultimately determines the 
financial gains creators earn from their sound recordings.158  
1. Producer/Recorder Contributions 
When determining a claim of infringement for a copyrighted 
sound recording as part of the de minimis inquiry, the Ninth Circuit 
said all that matters is “how the musicians played the notes.”159  This 
statement is arguably erroneous because it ignores the recorder’s 
performance.  This distinction should not be taken lightly.  As 
indicated in the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976, the 
elements of sound recordings can be very different from those of a 
musical composition.160  As noted by Congress, it is not only the way 
in which the underlying composition was performed that constitutes 
the protectable parts of the sound recording, but also the contribution 
 
154 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2016). 
155 See Jones v. Blige, 558 F.3d 485, 490-91 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Where there is no direct 
evidence of copying, a plaintiff may establish an inference of copying by showing (1) access 
to the allegedly-infringed work by the defendant(s) and (2) a substantial similarity between 
the two works at issue.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Nova Design Build, Inc. 
v. Grace Hotels, LLC, 652 F.3d 814, 817 (7th Cir. 2011); Elements of Copyright Infringement 
Claim—Substantial Similarity, 6A FED. PROC. FORMS § 17:71 (June ed. 2018). 
156 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 879. 
157 Id. at 877. 
158 Id. at 881. 
159 Id. at 879 (emphasis in original). 
160 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5669. 
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by the producer responsible for setting up the recording session.161  The 
House Judiciary Committee went as far to say that 
the copyrightable elements in a sound recording will 
usually . . . involve “authorship” both on the part of the 
performers . . . and on the part of the record producer . 
. . there may be cases (for example, recording of 
birdcalls, sounds of racing cars, et cetera) where only 
the record producer’s contribution is copyrightable.162 
Music producers can add a multitude of additional elements to 
a sound recording that accompany the musician’s performance.163  It 
should be noted that this very case came to the Ninth Circuit, not 
because of how Madonna “played her notes,” but because of an idea 
from her producer that the song needed something more.164  Thus, this 
analysis is suspect because the Ninth Circuit began its inquiry without 
 
161 See id. 
162 See id. (emphasis added). 
163 Rick Camp, What Does A Music Producer Do?, RECORDING CONNECTION, 
https://www.recordingconnection.com/reference-library/recording-entrepreneurs/what-does-
a-music-producer-do/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2018) (“The music producer is in charge of either 
writing the material or if he didn’t write it, he’s in charge of organizing it and making it sound 
like a cohesive song.  He calls all the shots on what’s played, and when it’s played, and how 
it’s played, and the sounds that are used, or the vocals that are recorded if they’re correct or 
not.  The producer is in charge of everything.” (emphasis added)); see also New Old Music 
Grp., Inc. v. Gottwald, 122 F. Supp. 3d 78, 94 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“For this ‘improper 
appropriation’ prong, ‘it is essential that the similarity relate to copyrightable material. . . . 
When similar works resemble each other only in unprotected aspects . . . defendant prevails.’ 
Muller, 794 F.Supp.2d at 440 (quoting Bill Diodato Photography, LLC v. Kate Spade, LLC, 
388 F.Supp.2d 382, 389-90 (S.D.N.Y.2005).”).  Whether material is copyrightable depends on 
whether the work is “original to the author.”  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 
U.S. 340, 345 (1991).  Originality, as the term is used in copyright, “means only that the work 
was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it 
possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.”  Id.  The “requisite level of creativity is 
extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.”  Id.  “Originality does not signify novelty; 
a work may be original even though it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity 
is fortuitous, not the result of copying.”  Id.  As the Supreme Court has explained, if two poets, 
“each ignorant of the other,” composed identical poems, each would be copyrightable since 
they are both original, though neither is novel.  Id. at 345-46. 
164 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Pettibone directed 
an engineer to introduce sounds from Love Break into the recording of Vogue.”); Id. at 879-
80 (“Pettibone copied one quarter-note of a four-note chord, lasting 0.23 seconds; he isolated 
the horns by filtering out the other instruments playing at the same time; he transposed it to a 
different key; he truncated it; and he added effects and other sounds to the chord itself.”); Id. 
at 889 (Silverman, J., dissenting) (“The defendants wanted horns to punctuate their song, so 
they took the plaintiff’s copyrighted recording of horns.  The horn hit is brief, but clearly 
perceptible and does its job.”). 
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mentioning the copyrightable elements contributed by, not just the 
performer, but the producer as well.  
2. Precedent Based on Musical Compositions 
The Ninth Circuit in VGM, and the district court in Bridgeport, 
relied on the Ninth Circuit case, Newton v. Diamond,165 which 
involved the de minimis doctrine’s applicability in musical sampling 
copyright disputes.166  The court in Newton decided whether the de 
minimis doctrine could be used as a defense against a claim of alleged 
infringement of a musical composition after legally sampling a portion 
from a sound recording.167  The plaintiff, James Netwon, was a jazz 
flutist and composer who composed the song “Choir” in 1978.168  In 
1981, he subsequently preformed and recorded “Choir” and licensed 
all rights in the sound recording to EMC records.169  The license only 
covered the sound recording and Newton still retained all rights in the 
musical composition.  In 1992, the Beastie Boys, the defendants in the 
suit, licensed from EMC records the rights to use portions of the sound 
recording “Choir” in their song “Pass the Mic.”170  Newton filed suit, 
arguing that the incorporation of the six-second, three-note segment 
infringed his copyright in the composition because of the unique 
performance elements used in conjunction with the composition.171  
The court held that the performance elements were captured in the 
sound recording but not the composition.172  However, because the 
Beastie Boys had rights to the sound recording, its analysis could only 
focus on the de minimis nature of the sampling as it pertained to the 
musical composition.173  
The district court granted summary judgment to the Beastie 
Boys, holding that the three notes lacked sufficient originality to merit 
 
165 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004) 
166 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 877; see Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. 
Supp. 2d 830, 841 (M.D. Tenn. 2002), rev’d, 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004), republished as 
modified on reh’g, 401 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 2004), amended on reh’g, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 
2005). 
167 Newton, 388 F.3d at 1193-94. 
168 Id. at 1190-91. 
169 Id. at 1191. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. (“First, Newton argues that the score contains an instruction that requires 
overblowing the background C note that is played on the flute.”). 
172 Newton, 388 F.3d at 1194. 
173 Id. 
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copyright protection and its use was de minimis.174  The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed, finding the Beastie Boys’ use of the three-note segment was 
de minimis because the issue had to be determined solely on the 
musical composition and not on the unique performance elements; “no 
reasonable juror could find the sampled portion of the composition to 
be a quantitatively or qualitatively significant portion of the 
composition as a whole.”175  
Because Newton dealt with sampling of a musical composition 
versus a sound recording, the Sixth Circuit chose not to follow it in its 
ruling in Bridgeport.176  The Sixth Circuit’s decision to depart from the 
Ninth Circuit’s and other courts’ application of the de minimis inquiry 
regarding musical compositions may have merit.  In Newton, the 
Beastie Boys legally acquired the license to sample the sound 
recording.177  This fact stands in complete contrast to the issue 
presented in Bridgeport, which dealt with the determination of whether 
the sampling of a sound recording was considered infringement.178  
The court in Newton made clear that the need to “filter out” the licensed 
elements of sound recordings for its inquiry was paramount because 
the sound recording was sampled legally.179  Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s 
use of the Newton case is questionable as a basis for determining 
infringement for the sampling of a sound recording because 
infringement of a sound recording was not the issue argued.  Thus, 
because of the stark differences between the elements and interest of 
musical compositions and sound recordings, the Sixth Circuit was 
 
174 Id. at 1190. 
175 Id. at 1194-97. 
176 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 802-03 n. 17 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(“We have not addressed several of the cases frequently cited in music copyright cases because 
in the main they involve infringement of the composition copyright and not the sound 
recording copyright or were decided on other grounds. . . . We note that in Newton, the matter 
at issue was infringement of the composition copyright.  The alleged infringer had secured a 
license for use of the sound recording.”). 
177 Newton, 388 F.3d at 1190. 
178 See Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d at 792. 
179 Newton, 388 F.3d at 1193-94 (“This case involves not only use of a composition, as was 
the case in Fisher, but also use of a sound recording of a particular performance of that 
composition.  Because the defendants were authorized to use the sound recording, our inquiry 
is confined to whether the unauthorized use of the composition itself was substantial enough 
to sustain an infringement claim.  Therefore, we may consider only Beastie Boys’ 
appropriation of the song’s compositional elements and must remove from consideration all 
the elements unique to Newton’s performance.  Stated another way, we must ‘filter out’ the 
licensed elements of the sound recording to get down to the unlicensed elements of the 
composition, as the composition is the sole basis for Newton’s infringement claim.”). 
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justified in departing from these types of precedents that dealt with 
musical composition sampling alone.  
3. The Lay Public Control 
The Ninth Circuit said that, because an average audience or lay 
public is the targeted audience for the potential financial returns for 
creators of sound recordings, then an average audience is also the 
appropriate audience to determine if copyright infringement has 
occurred.180  Therefore, if an average audience cannot recognize the 
appropriation, then there is no infringement because the copier has 
“not benefitted from the original artist’s expressive content.”181  This 
rationale is problematic because it does not take into account the 
audience of the lucrative market selling and buying samples,182 an 
oversight that could potentially have negative impacts on those 
engaged in this market.183  The Ninth Circuit’s proclamation that the 
only people in the market for sound recordings are the “lay public”184 
reflects an error by the Ninth Circuit for failure to factor in the “high-
tech economy”185 of the sampling market, where the intended audience 
 
180 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 881 (9th Cir. 2016) (mentioning the long 
history of the test used in the general area of copyright law.). 
181 Id. 
182 Grant Rinder, The Drum Kit Market: How Producers Are Selling Sounds to Supplement 
Income, PIGEONS & PLANES (Sept. 7, 2017), http://pigeonsandplanes.com/in-depth/2017/09/ 
producers-supplementing-income-selling-drum-kits (“‘I kind of caught the tail end of the 
transition out of beat machines and into software.  Back when I was coming up in hip-hop 
production, there was this culture of sampling records, getting your drum sounds from the 
crates, breaking up drum breaks, and all that stuff,’ says Illmind, who has worked with Kanye 
West, Drake, and 50 Cent. ‘So one day I decide to compile a folder.  I think it had 120 of my 
own drum sounds.  In my mind I’m like, “What would I pay for this? I should charge a couple 
hundred bucks but I want it to be affordable and accessible,” so I set a price point of $20.’”). 
183 See Di Cosmo, supra note 27, at 242 (“Yet another criticism of the substantial similarity 
test is that its focus on similarity rather than harm is inconsistent with the purposes of copyright 
law.  The substantial similarity test, by focusing analysis entirely on the characteristics of the 
defendant’s work, does not include any consideration of the harm that a defendant’s work may 
do to the plaintiff.” (emphasis added)); see also Molly McGraw, Sound Sampling Protection 
and Infringement in Today’s Music Industry, 4 HIGH TECH. L.J. 147, 164 (1989) (“In the 
typical case, the trier of fact is instructed not to inquire into the value of the allegedly 
appropriated portion standing alone, but rather into its importance to the effect of the 
complaining song.  The oft-quoted rule is ‘no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how 
much of his work he did not pirate.’  Whether this rule will be imported into cases where the 
‘complaining song’ is little more than a phrasing remains to be seen.” (footnotes omitted)). 
184 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 881. 
185 Jacob Goldstein, The Producer Who Created ‘Beat Kits’ Behind Today’s Pop Music, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO, INC. (Sept. 26, 2017, 4:29 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/26/553799 
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is not the “lay public” but artists and music producers alike.186  As an 
article on the subject noted, “[m]usic producers buy and sell musical 
snippets to each other.  They text each other half-finished beats.  
There’s even a market for the sound of a single tap of a snare drum or 
a single perfect yell.”187 
Even though the lay audience does not pay for sampling per se, 
defendants typically pay license fees or royalties to use sampling in 
their sound recording, so plaintiffs are economically harmed when not 
compensated for the sounds used without their authorization.188  Had 
the Ninth Circuit taken this market into account, it may have 
determined that producers and artists in the field versus an average 
audience may have been the more appropriate audience for inquiry into 
the sampling of sound recordings.189   
Lastly, many scholars and other circuits have taken issue with 
the substantial similarity or de minimis test beyond its application to 
sound recordings.190  The substantial similarity inquiry is typically 
used by courts to determine if there has been actual copying, absent 
direct evidence of such.191  To infer that copying occurred, a plaintiff 
 
207/the-producer-who-created-beat-kits-behind-todays-pop-music. 
186 See id.; see also Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 801 (4th 
Cir. 2001) (referring to the substantial similarity test, stating “[i]n most cases, when a 
copyrighted work will be directed at the public in general, the court need only apply a general 
public formulation to the intended audience test.  But when it is clear that the work is intended 
for a more particular audience, the court’s inquiry must be focused upon the perspectives of 
the persons who comprise that group” (citations omitted)). 
187 Goldstein, supra note 185. 
188 See Di Cosmo, supra note 27, at 242; see also Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension 
Films, 410 F.3d 792, 804 (6th Cir. 2005). 
189 Cf. Jamie Lund, Fixing Music Copyright, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 61, 93 (2013) (“Both 
computer code and musical compositions are in some way ‘blueprints’ for future expression.  
Neither a computer code nor a musical composition is immediately accessible or marketed to 
the layperson.  This similarity would suggest that the layperson is not the intended audience 
for a computer program or a musical composition.  The best way to determine the value of 
computer code and musical compositions, then, would be to ask the programmers and 
musicians directly.”). 
190 Godoy-Dalmau, supra note 104, at 249 (“Some scholars have argued for significant 
procedural overhauls while others have argued for more focused substantive fixes.”). 
191 See Jones v. Blige, 558 F.3d 485, 490-91 (6th Cir. 2009). (“Where there is no direct 
evidence of copying, a plaintiff may establish an inference of copying by showing (1) access 
to the allegedly-infringed work by the defendant(s) and (2) a substantial similarity between 
the two works at issue.” (internal quotations omitted)); see also Nova Design Build, Inc. v. 
Grace Hotels, LLC, 652 F.3d 814, 817 (7th Cir. 2011); Elements of Copyright Infringement 
Claim—Substantial Similarity, 6A FED. PROC. FORMS § 17:71 (June ed. 2018); Amy B. Cohen, 
Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 719, 735 (1987). 
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must prove the defendant had access to the material and that the alleged 
infringed work is substantially similar, as determined by an ordinary 
observer.192  The Ninth Circuit in VGM did not use the test to determine 
whether there was actually copying,193 but it used the same average 
audience inquiry to determine whether the conceded appropriation was 
recognizable to a lay audience; if not, then the copying could be 
considered de minimis and not actionable.194  The Ninth Circuit may 
have misapplied this test by using it for misappropriation instead of 
actual copying.  The former determining if the appropriated work rises 
to the level of an infringement, the latter determining if in fact the work 
was copied at all, notwithstanding the amount appropriated.195  As 
noted by one author writing about the substantial similarity test and its 
current use by the courts: 
By relying on the concept of “substantial similarity” as 
determined by an ordinary observer, [courts are] 
confus[ing] the issue of copying with that of 
misappropriation. The confusion of these two issues 
had many undesirable consequences, as is shown by 
examining the way more recent courts have used 
“substantial similarity” in determining infringement.196 
Based on this understanding, the Ninth Circuit may have fallen 
victim to confusing copying and misappropriation.197  This confusion 
 
192 Unicolors, Inc. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 853 F.3d 980, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A 
plaintiff must show ‘copying’ of a protected work to prove copyright infringement.  If there is 
no direct evidence of copying, a plaintiff may prove this element through circumstantial 
evidence that (1) the defendant had access to the copyrighted work prior to the creation of 
defendant’s work and (2) there is substantial similarity of the general ideas and expression 
between the copyrighted work and the defendant’s work.”).  For information on the further 
uses/versions of this test, see supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.  
193 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[F]or purposes of 
summary judgment, Plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence (including direct evidence) to 
create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether copying in fact occurred.  Taking the facts 
in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has demonstrated actual copying.”). 
194 Id. at 878-80. 
195 See infra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.  
196 Cohen, supra note 191. 
197 See Cohen, supra note 191; see also Di Cosmo, supra note 27, at 239-40 (“One of the 
primary criticisms of the substantial similarity test is that it fails to properly account for the 
basic concept of copying.  Copying occurs where the defendant has used the plaintiff’s work 
rather than creating a similar work independently or by using common public domain sources.  
Traditionally, misappropriation has been defined as occurring where copying goes far enough 
to constitute improper appropriation.  The substantial similarity test essentially only considers 
whether a work is similar to the copyrighted one—not whether it has actually been copied—
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may have led to an inquiry that is not the most appropriate test for the 
sampling of sound recordings.  In sampling cases where the 
appropriation is already conceded by both parties, or must be, for 
summary judgment,198 determining the substantial similarity between 
two works is irrelevant.  First, as argued, sampling creates a derivative 
work and is the exclusive right of the copyright holder.199  Second, this 
test is typically used for determining copying and not necessarily 
misappropriation.200  
Lastly, the First Circuit held, “de minimis copying is best 
viewed not as a separate defense to copyright infringement but rather 
as a statement regarding the strength of the plaintiff’s proof of 
substantial similarity.”201  Thus, the reflexive application by the Ninth 
Circuit may lead to works being labeled de minimis when, in fact, 
infringement is occurring. 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 
114 
After the Ninth Circuit’s de minimis inquiry, the court further 
addressed statutory arguments made by VGM, premised on the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision in Bridgeport.202  Based on the Bridgeport ruling, 
the plaintiff argued that, even if the copied sample was found to be 
trivial, it is irrelevant because the de minimis exception does not apply 
to the infringement of copyrighted sound recordings.203  The court 
rephrased the plaintiff’s argument, stating that the plaintiff asserted 
that, “Congress intended to create a special rule for copyright sound 
recordings, [by] eliminating the de minimis exception,”204 which the 
 
and then finds misappropriation (and thus infringement) where the similarity is great enough 
to arrive at some arbitrary level deemed by the court to be substantial.” (footnotes omitted)). 
198 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 877. 
199 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800-01 (6th Cir. 2005); 
Howard, supra note 74. 
200 See Jones v. Blige, 558 F.3d 485, 490-91 (6th Cir. 2009). (“Where there is no direct 
evidence of copying, a plaintiff may establish an inference of copying by showing (1) access 
to the allegedly-infringed work by the defendant(s) and (2) a substantial similarity between 
the two works at issue.” (internal quotations omitted)); see also Nova Design Build, Inc. v. 
Grace Hotels, LLC, 652 F.3d 814, 817 (7th Cir. 2011); Elements of Copyright Infringement 
Claim—Substantial Similarity, 6A FED. PROC. FORMS § 17:71 (June ed. 2018); Cohen, supra 
note 191. 
201 Situation Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. ASP. Consulting LLC, 560 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2009). 
202 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 880. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 881 (emphasis added). 
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court later equated to an “implicit expansion”205 of the rights of sound 
recording copyright holders.  The court refuted this argument based on 
three major points.  First, from a plain reading of the copyright statute, 
Congress did not create a special rule for sound recordings as opposed 
to the other works included in the statute.206  Second, the legislative 
history of the statute does not create a special rule or exception for the 
de minimis inquiry of sound recordings.207  Lastly, the court ultimately 
rejected the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the copyright statute that 
the plaintiff relied upon.208   
1. The Ninth Circuit’s Plain Meaning Analysis  
The court started with a plain reading of 17 U.S.C. § 102209 and 
explained why sound recordings were not treated differently than all 
other types of protected works.210  The court determined that nothing 
in the text suggested any differential treatment between a sound 
recording and any of the other works listed.211  The Ninth Circuit 
referred to 17 U.S.C. § 106212  and found that a plain reading of this 
 
205 See id. at 881-83. 
206 Id. 
207 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 883. 
208 Id. at 884. 
209 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018), which provides: 
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now 
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, 
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine 
or device. Works of authorship include the following categories:  
(1) literary works;  
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;  
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;  
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;  
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;  
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;  
(7) sound recordings; and  
(8) architectural works.  
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship 
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is 
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. 
210 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 881-82. 
211 Id. 
212 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018), which provides: 
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section did not “suggest[] differential treatment of de minimis copying 
of sound recordings,” as compared to other works.213 
The Ninth Circuit then interpreted the plain meaning of 17 
U.S.C § 114(b).  This section states: 
The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a 
sound recording under clauses (1) and (2) of section 
106 do not extend to the making or duplication of 
another sound recording that consists entirely of an 
independent fixation of other sounds, even though such 
sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted 
sound recording.214  
The Ninth Circuit concluded that a straightforward reading of this 
quoted sentence from § 114 revealed that Congress intended to limit 
the rights of sound recording copyright holders because the statute 
contained the words “do not extend” when speaking about the 
exclusive rights given to copyright holders of sound recordings.215  
However, the Ninth Circuit was particular in how it interpreted this 
part of the statute.  The court’s plain meaning reading of § 114(b) was 
phrased as: “The exclusive rights of the owner of a copyright in a sound 
recording . . . do not extend to the making or duplication of another 
 
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this 
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:  
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;  
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;  
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending;  
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform 
the copyrighted work publicly;  
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the 
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display 
the copyrighted work publicly; and  
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work 
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission. 
213 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 882 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added); but cf. Griffin v. J-
Records, 398 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1142-43 (E.D. Wash. 2005) (“Copyright in a sound recording 
does not give the same scope of exclusive rights as for other types of copyrighted works.”). 
214 17 U.S.C. § 114(b). 
215 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 883. 
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sound recording [with certain qualities].”216  This articulation 
suppresses and replaces words that are relevant to the Sixth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the same section. 
In its plain meaning analysis, the Ninth Circuit left out “clauses 
(1) and (2) of § 106,” the latter dealing with derivative works.217  
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit replaced the language after “sound 
recording” from, “consists entirely of an independent fixation of other 
sounds,” to “with certain qualities.”218  The court’s exclusion of 
language that mentions the exclusive right to prepare derivative works, 
and entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, raises 
questions because that missing language is heavily relied upon by the 
Sixth Circuit219 in its interpretation of the same section of the statute.   
Instead of critiquing the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation head on, 
the Ninth Circuit left out the language that supported the Sixth 
Circuit’s position.  As noted by the dissent, “it is the majority that 
tortures the natural reading of these provisions.  Bear in mind that § 
114(b) simply explains the scope of exclusive rights already granted to 
copyright holders under § 106.  These two provisions must be read 
together, as the Sixth Circuit did.”220  It is unknown why the Ninth 
Circuit decided to frame the language of the statute in this manner.  
When compared to the statute itself, these omissions and additions of 
language critical to the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation raise serious 
questions as to the Ninth Circuit’s plain meaning analysis of 17 U.S.C. 
§ 114(b).  
i. Limits on the Rights of Sound 
Recordings 
The Ninth Circuit finished its plain meaning analysis by 
discussing each instance of implied limiting language in the statute as 
a basis to refute the Sixth Circuit’s Bridgeport ruling that, according 
to the Ninth Circuit, implicitly expanded the rights of copyright 
 
216 Id. (emphasis in original).  See the language of 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) above; this important 
language is left out, and “certain qualities” are nowhere to be found in the statute. 
217 17 U.S.C. § 114. 
218 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 883.  It should be noted that the court never explained what 
the certain qualities are. 
219 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800-01 n.10 (6th Cir. 
2005). 
220 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 889-90 (Silverman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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holders in sound recordings.221   The court said, “first sentence: 
‘exclusive rights . . . do not extend’ to certain circumstances; second 
sentence: ‘exclusive rights . . . do not extend’ to certain circumstances; 
fourth sentence: ‘exclusive rights . . . do not apply’ in certain 
circumstances.”222  After this enumeration, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that it is hard to find an “implicit expansion” of the rights provided by 
this section when Congress has so many mentions of an “express 
limitation” on the rights.223  
First, uncertainty exists among the courts as to the scope of 
“limits” envisioned by Congress.  In Griffin v. J-Records,224 the 
Eastern District of Washington described the limits of the exclusive 
right on sound recordings much like the Sixth Circuit: 
the exclusive right of reproduction is limited to the right 
to duplicate the sounds in a form “that directly or 
indirectly recaptures the actual sounds fixed in the 
recording.” A sound recording copyright does not give 
a right to prevent others from making an independent 
fixation of sounds that “imitate or simulate” those in the 
copyrighted sound recording. Thus, the remedy of the 
owner of a sound recording copyright is largely limited 
to proceeding against the tape or record “pirate” who 
without permission makes a reproduction of the actual 
sounds in a protected recording.225 
This finding, that the copyright holder is limited to duplicate its own 
actual sounds and limited to seek remedies from unlicensed persons 
who reproduce the actual sounds, articulates an interpretation of the 
extent of the restrictions on the exclusive rights of sound recordings.  
This understanding by the Eastern District of Washington supports the 
Sixth Circuit’s holding, that found that the statute limits the protections 
of copyright holders of sound recordings to only the actual sounds 
fixed.  Which in turn, effectively limits copyright holders protections 
and an ability to claim infringement against imitations of the sound 
recording that are entirely independent of actual fixed sounds.226  
 
221 See id. at 883. 
222 Id. 
223 See id. 
224 Griffin v. J-Records, 398 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (E.D. Wash. 2005). 
225 Id. at 1142-43 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
226 In 2014 the District of New Jersey also discussed the “limits” of sound recordings and 
found the Bridgeport interpretation to be correct.  Zany Toys, LLC v. Pearl Enters., LLC, No. 
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Further, the court’s interpretation disagrees with the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation, which indicated that the limits to the copyright holder’s 
protections in sound recordings might reach into the actual sounds 
themselves.227  Thus, because ambiguity exists for what Congress 
envisioned the “limit” in sound recording copyright would be, the 
Ninth Circuit’s conclusion based merely in finding language in the 
statute that indicates a limit on the right, without further context or 
support as to what that the limit is, arguably makes the court’s 
conclusion incomplete. 
Second, the Ninth Circuit’s basis for believing that Congress 
intended to limit protections for holders is grounded in the court’s 
failure to find affirmative language supporting an expansion of 
rights.228  This determination was premised on the conclusion that the 
Sixth Circuit’s holding in Bridgeport, in effect, expanded the copyright 
holders’ rights.  The Ninth Circuit’s majority did not take account of 
the fact that the Sixth Circuit merely explained what the right entails, 
and not “expanding” a right, as discussed in the dissent.229  Thus, to 
base its conclusion on a debatable premise aids an idea that the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning is incomplete and unpersuasive.  Nevertheless, the 
Ninth Circuit said that congressional intent can be found through the 
legislative history, even if there is some ambiguity regarding the plain 




CIV.A. 13-5262 (JAP)(TJB), 2014 WL 2168415, at *11-12 (D.N.J. May 23, 2014) (“[T]he 
Copyright Act confers more limited rights than to other types of copyrighted work.  See 17 
U.S.C. §§ 106, 114. . . . [T]he reproduction right is limited to the right to duplicate the sound 
recording in the form of phonorecords or copies that directly or indirectly recapture the actual 
sounds fixed in the recording. . . . The exclusive rights of the owner of a copyright in a sound 
recording . . . do not extend to the making or duplication of another sound recording that 
consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate 
or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording. . . . Therefore, courts have found that 
copyright protection for sound recordings extends only to duplications of such recordings, not 
to imitations.  See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d at 800.” (first 
alteration added) (emphasis added)). 
227 See VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016). 
228 See id. at 883. 
229 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005); VMG 
Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 889 (Silverman, J., dissenting) (“That right was not invented by the Sixth 
Circuit: it already exists in the statutes.  And these statutes say nothing about the de minimis 
exception.” (emphasis added)). 
230 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 883. 
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2. The Ninth Circuit’s Legislative History 
Analysis of 17 U.S.C. § 114 
The Ninth Circuit’s legislative history scrutiny is based on two 
quotes from H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476.231  The court largely used the 
same methods for this analysis as it used for its plain meaning analysis.  
The first passage of legislative history deals with its statutory structure 
argument and says, “[t]he approach of the bill is to set forth the 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights in broad terms in section 106, and 
then to provide various limitations, qualifications, or exemptions in the 
12 sections that follow.  Thus, everything in section 106 . . . must be 
read in conjunction with those provisions.”232  The court reasoned that 
the language from the passage proved that Congress intended section 
114 to limit the rights of copyright holders rather than “expand[] their 
rights.”233  Still, under this presumption that the holding in Bridgeport 
“expanded a right,” the Ninth Circuit came to its first legislative history 
determination by scanning a congressional document that indicated 
proof of Congress’s intent to limit a copyright holder’s protection.234  
Again, there are competing versions of what Congress meant when it 
used the word “limit” in the creation of the statute;235 the Ninth Circuit 
merely finding the word “limit” used in the statute, absent any context 
that supports limited protections on actual sounds, is again 
unpersuasive.236 
Moreover, in the report cited by the Ninth Circuit, the House 
Judiciary Committee mentioned the limits envisioned for § 114(b):  
Section 114(b) provides that the “exclusive right of the 
owner of copyright in a sound recording under clause 
(2) of section 106 is limited to the right to prepare a 
derivative work . . . actual sounds fixed in the sound 
recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered 
in sequence or quality.”237   
 
231 Id. at 883-84. 
232 Id. at 883 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61 (1976)). 
233 See id. at 883-84. 
234 See id. 
235 See supra text accompanying notes 224-27. 
236 See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 883-84. 
237 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 106 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5721 
(emphasis added). 
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This section of the same congressional history comports with the Sixth 
Circuit’s and Washington district court’s findings; the intent was to 
limit claims against imitations or simulations of protected works.238  
Thus, the passage quoted by the Ninth Circuit showed that Congress 
intended to limit the rights of copyright holders in sound recordings; 
however, it is still arguable that the limit was on the exclusive right to 
prepare derivatives from the sound recordings that were not merely 
imitations or simulations.239  Because uncertainty exists, this may 
suggest that finding the word “limit” in the legislative history, alone, 
is simply not enough to support the Ninth Circuit’s finding. 
The second passage from H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 stated: 
Subsection (b) of section 114 makes clear that statutory 
protection for sound recordings extends only to the 
particular sounds of which the recording consists and 
would not prevent a separate recording of another 
performance in which those sounds are imitated. Thus, 
infringement takes place whenever all or any 
substantial portion of the actual sounds that go to make 
up a copyrighted sound recording are reproduced in 
phonorecords by repressing, transcribing, recapturing 
off the air, or any other method, or by reproducing them 
in the soundtrack or audio portion of a motion picture 
or other audiovisual work. Mere imitation of a recorded 
performance would not constitute a copyright 
infringement even where one performer deliberately 
sets out to simulate another’s performance as exactly as 
possible.240 
The court explained that the phrase “any substantial portion” 
was dispositive language that proved that “Congress intended to 
maintain the de minimis exception for copyrighted sound 
recordings.”241  Although, on its face, this reasoning sounded logical, 
 
238 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800 (6th Cir. 2005); see 
also Griffin v. J-Records, 398 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1142-43 (E.D. Wash. 2005); Zany Toys, LLC 
v. Pearl Enterprises, LLC, No. CIV.A. 13-5262 (JAP)(TJB), 2014 WL 2168415, at *11-12 
(D.N.J. May 23, 2014). 
239 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800; see also Griffin, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1142-43; Zany 
Toys,, 2014 WL 2168415, at *11. 
240 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 883 (emphasis in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, 
at 106 (1976)). 
241 Id. at 884. 
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it could be argued that the legislature intended to discuss the fair use 
defense versus the de minimis exception.  This is because the phrase 
“any substantial portion,” relied upon by the Ninth Circuit for 
rationalizing Congress’s intent to keep the de minimis exception is 
found, almost verbatim, directly in the language of the statute creating 
the fair use doctrine: “[i]n determining whether the use made of a work 
in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall 
include . . . (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole . . . .”242   
Fair use was codified at the same time as copyright protections 
for sound recordings.  As a House Judiciary Committee member stated 
in the same report cited above: “[t]he judicial doctrine of fair use, one 
of the most important and well established limitations on the exclusive 
right of copyright owners, would be given express statutory 
recognition for the first time in section 107.”243  Thus, the Ninth 
Circuit’s analysis appears less convincing because Congress may have 
been signaling fair use, instead of a de minimis exception, when it 
mentioned the word “substantial” in its report.  Therefore, courts 
deciding which approach to follow for these types of cases should keep 
in mind that the Sixth Circuit’s ruling leaves the possibility of the fair 
use defense,244 which, as argued, may have been Congress’s intention 
all along.  
3. The Ninth Circuit’s Critique of the 
Bridgeport Holding 
The Ninth Circuit continued its analysis of 17 U.S.C. § 114 
with a critique of the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the same statute 
in Bridgeport.245  The Ninth Circuit first reasoned that the Sixth 
Circuit’s interpretation of § 114(b) must be rejected because it did not 
consider the statutory structure and it ignored the “expressed 
limitations.”246  However, as discussed above, the Ninth Circuit’s 
 
242 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018) (emphasis added). 
243 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678 
(emphasis added.). 
244 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805 (“Since the district judge found no infringement, there was 
no necessity to consider the affirmative defense of ‘fair use.’  On remand, the trial judge is 
free to consider this defense and we express no opinion on its applicability to these facts.”). 
245 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 884. 
246 Id. 
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statutory structure “limit” theory raises issues of its own.247  The Ninth 
Circuit’s methods, and the rationale for those methods, in both its plain 
meaning and legislative history analysis, are arguably unsupported.  
Thus, rejecting the Sixth Circuit’s claim solely because it did not take 
the Ninth Circuit’s questionable approach is unpersuasive.   
The Ninth Circuit then reasoned that the Sixth Circuit’s 
analysis should be rejected because it did not take into account the 
legislative history.248 The Sixth Circuit did not engage in a legislative 
history analysis of sampling because digital sampling was not yet 
created when Congress enacted the statute.249  Yet, the Sixth Circuit 
did recount the history of the Copyright Act regarding its enactment to 
combat piracy of sound recordings.250  
The Ninth Circuit then explained that the Sixth Circuit’s 
conclusion about the word “entirely” in the statute, and its legal effect, 
should be rejected because it was based on a logical fallacy.251  The 
court stated, “[a] statement that rights do not extend to a particular 
circumstance does not automatically mean that the rights extend to all 
other circumstances.  In logical terms, it is a fallacy to infer the inverse 
of a conditional from the conditional.”252  Just because one circuit 
concludes that an argument may be a fallacy does not explicitly mean 
that the argument is, in fact, incorrect; this assumption, itself, is 
 
247 See supra notes 221-36 and accompanying text. 
248 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 884 (“We reject that interpretation of § 114(b).  Bridgeport 
ignored the statutory structure and § 114(b)’s express limitation on the rights of a copyright 
holder.  Bridgeport also declined to consider legislative history on the ground that ‘digital 
sampling wasn’t being done in 1971.’” (citation omitted)).  
249 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805. 
250 Id. at 800. 
251 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 884; see also Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800-01 (“The 
significance of this provision is amplified by the fact that the Copyright Act of 1976 added the 
word ‘entirely’ to this language.  Compare Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-140, 85 
Stat. 391 (Oct. 15, 1971).”). 
252 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 884. 
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actually a fallacy.253  Thus, as the dissent in VGM also concluded, this 
argument should not be given too much weight.254  
It must be reiterated that the Ninth Circuit, for reasons 
unknown, during its interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 114(b), made no 
mention of the Sixth Circuit’s analysis of the section on the exclusive 
right to prepare a derivative work.255  If the Ninth Circuit had 
mentioned this, then its ruling allowing for some forms of sampling-
without-permission, may have been difficult to reach.  When a person 
applies for a license of a sound recording, he must fill out a Form SR.256  
If the sound recording he seeks to license contains a sample, thus, a 
derivative work,257 the Form SR requires that he disclose “any 
preexisting work or works that this work is based on or incorporates . 
. . [and/or] a brief, general statement of the material that has been 
added to this work and in which copyright is claimed.”258  
Further, because the creator of this new work would have to 
disclose any sampled portion he incorporated into his work, he would 
either have to lie on the Form SR, thereby committing fraud, or advise 
 
253 Fallacist’s Fallacy, LOGICAL FALLACIES, http://www.logicalfallacies.info/relevance/ 
fallacists/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2018) (“The fallacist’s fallacy involves rejecting an idea as 
false simply because the argument offered for it is fallacious.  Having examined the case for a 
particular point of view, and found it wanting, it can be tempting to conclude that the point of 
view is false.  This, however, would be to go beyond the evidence.”); Fallacy Fallacy, 
FALLACY FILES, http://www.fallacyfiles.org/fallfall.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2018) (“[T]he 
Fallacy Fallacy is committed only when a conclusion is rejected as false because an argument 
for it is fallacious, that is, commits a logical fallacy.  Since a logical fallacy is a mistake in 
reasoning that is common enough to be named, not just any bad argument will do.”). 
254 See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 888 (Silverman, J., dissenting) (“The majority chooses to 
follow the views [i.e. the fallacy argument] of a popular treatise instead of an on-point decision 
of the Sixth Circuit, a decision that has governed the music industry in Nashville—“Music 
City.’”). 
255 See generally id. 
256 Form SR, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., Dec. 2016, https://www.copyright.gov/forms/form 
sr.pdf (“Use Form SR for registration of published or unpublished sound recordings.”). 
257 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800-01 (6th Cir. 2005); 
Howard, supra note 74; Digital Sampling Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL, 
https://definitions.uslegal.com/d/digital-sampling/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2018) (“Digital 
sampling refers to a technique of taking a recorded passage from an already existing or 
recorded musical, spoken or other work and then adding it into a new recording.  It is referred 
as a sample and is regularly used in a repetitive manner or backwards or in combination with 
other sounds or samples.  Even though the sample may be no longer recognizable, the new use 
is an infringement of a right treating it as a derivative work.  Permission is to be obtained for 
use of the sample.  The U.S. Copyright Act prohibits a person from copying the original artistic 
work of another, without consent.  If a person use [sic] a part of another’s work, even a very 
small part, without the copyright owner’s consent, s/he is infringing the owner’s rights.” 
(emphasis added)). 
258 Form SR, supra note 256 (emphasis added). 
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the copyright holder of what he sampled; if the holder believes he 
should be compensated for such an appropriation, the creator of the 
derivative work may be liable for infringement.259  Similar to the Sixth 
Circuit’s holding, this reasoning implies that there can be no de 
minimis inquiry for the sampling of sound recordings when the 
sampling has been conceded to because any amount of a sampled 
sound recording must be disclosed.  Moreover, these required 
disclosures could lend support to the idea that if a work is sampled, 
regardless of the amount, something of value260 was lifted. 
The Ninth Circuit then attacked the Sixth Circuit’s finding that 
the sampling of a sound recording is a physical taking rather than an 
intellectual one.  First, the court compared its sampling case to a case 
about a photograph used in a movie.261  It determined that, because the 
possibility of a physical taking existed in the photograph case and a de 
minimis inquiry applied, then it should also apply to its sampling 
case.262  Second, the court stated that even if a different standard should 
apply to sound recordings versus other works, “that theoretical 
difference does not mean that Congress actually adopted a different 
rule.”263  This argument does not take into account that the ruling in 
Bridgeport was not the creation of a “new rule” or standard per se, but 
rather the articulation of the right that was already created by 
Congress.264   
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Sixth Circuit’s 
analysis because copyright protection did not extend to the “fruit of the 
[author’s] labor” because it premised its understanding of the harm 
caused by physical takings of sound recordings on “merely saving 
 
259 Willis, supra note 5, at 321 (“In Zacchini, the Court announced that publishing an artist’s 
entire act constituted an act of infringement.  However, the Court did not address the question 
of partial publicity by another.  Copyright owners of sound recordings are guaranteed the right 
to publicity by section 114 of the Copyright Act of 1976.  Any unauthorized public display of 
a sound recording or musical composition should be considered an infringement.  The display 
of a de minimis taking is nonetheless a public offering of another person’s labor.  Such an 
offering is an act of infringement.” (emphasis added)). 
260 Cf. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 802. 
261 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 885 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Sandoval v. 
New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Because Sandoval’s photographs 
appear fleetingly and are obscured, severely out of focus, and virtually unidentifiable, we find 
the use of those photographs to be de minimis.”). 
262 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 885; see also Sandoval, 147 F.3d at 218. 
263 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 885. 
264 Id. at 889 (Silverman, J., dissenting) (“That right was not invented by the Sixth Circuit: 
it already exists in the statutes.  And these statutes say nothing about the de minimis 
exception.”). 
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cost” to the creator by not having to hire musicians.265  This analysis 
fails to take into account, again, that the value of a sound recording 
sample is not based on the financial savings to a creator for not having 
to hire musicians to make a new recording.  Sound recording samples 
are “a valuable property right, the stock-in-trade of artists who make 
their living recoding music and selling records,”266 i.e., licensing and 
royalty fees.  This point was articulated in VGM’s dissent, when Judge 
Silverman stated, “once the sound is fixed, it is tangible property 
belonging to the copyright holder.”267  Thus, for the reasons discussed, 
the Ninth Circuit’s critique of the Sixth Circuit’s approach to sampling 
not only had problems of its own, it also failed to further its 
determination as to why the Bridgeport finding should be rejected.  
Lastly, another reason exists for rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s approach 
besides its analysis.  Adoption of the court’s approach to this issue 
could also lead down a path to unanticipated complications for sound 
recording copyright law.  
V. THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF DE MINIMIS SAMPLINGS 
In regard to a slippery slope of the de minimis exception, the 
court in Holmes v. Board of Review268 held that, “[r]uling that an item 
is of such low value to be per se trivial would send the wrong message 
which could be seen as an authorization to [steal] below that amount . 
. . . [C]reat[ing] a de minimis [sic] exception . . . could similarly 
encourage . . . theft of low-value items over extended periods of 
time.”269  The courts may be “encouraging similar acts”270 by allowing 
for the taking of low value or trivial parts from a sound recording if it 
follows the Ninth Circuit holding, which could have unforeseen 
negative implications for the music industry.   
 
265 Id. at 885 (alteration in original). 
266 See id. at 888 (Silverman, J., dissenting). 
267 Id. at 890 (Silverman, J., dissenting). 
268 No. A-1420-15T1, 2017 WL 1056398 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 21, 2017).  This 
case was brought to the Superior court of New Jersey appellate division after an appeal by 
Holmes who was denied unemployment benefits after his discharge.  Id. at *1  “Holmes was 
discharged for taking ten bottles of water over a period of approximately three years, resulting 
in a loss of $16.90 for the retail store.”  Id.  The court affirmed the finding of the Board of 
Review and denied the unemployment benefits because although the left was low in value, the 
court did not want to create a de minimis exception for Holmes’ thievery, as it would 
potentially set a bad precedent.  Id. 
269 Id. at *3. 
270 Holmes, 2017 WL 1056398, at *3. 
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After the VGM ruling, anyone could arguably sample 
Madonna’s or VGM’s horn hit by incorporating it into his song without 
fear of a lawsuit, as long as his jurisdiction allows for the de minimis 
defense.  Because those horn hits have already been considered de 
minimis in the eyes of the Ninth Circuit, no infringement would occur 
if re-sampled.  Accordingly, once a sample has been labeled de minimis 
by law, that sound recording would not be afforded protections for 
either the original artist nor the sampler because this appropriation 
would not be actionable.  This trivial-sample is considered to be in the 
public domain because anyone could sample that horn hit, and neither 
Madonna nor VGM would have any right to compensation.  
Thus, the “encouragement”271 that could possibly come for 
courts creating de minimis exceptions for what they determine to be 
trivial may, in fact, perpetuate a mentality for would-be infringers to 
just roll the proverbial dice when deciding to sample another’s sound 
recording because he could assert the de minimis defense.  Samplers 
could take their chances at unlicensed sampling and, if caught, claim 
as a threshold matter that the appropriation is de minimis, fostering the 
cliche: “it’s easier to ask forgiveness than it is to get permission.” 
Moreover, if the de minimis exception is allowed for sampling, 
and there is no limiting principle in place, what is to stop an artist from 
creating an album on the premise that every song in the album has 
some small insignificant or trivial piece of another copyrighted song 
in it?  Could an artist do so without concern of litigation because the 
parts taken may be considered de minimis by law?  A real-life example 
shows that this fear has become a reality:  
While some artists are still producing heavily-sampled 
albums, it seems only those with the most obvious fair 
use defense are confident enough to do so without a 
license, perhaps recognizing the strength of their 
defense and realizing record companies would rather 
not risk setting bad precedent. The D.J. Gregg Gillis, 
better known as Girl Talk, is perhaps the most notorious 
sampler; he uses hundreds of small samples on a single 
album, never licenses anything, generates tons of 
publicity, and is never sued. As Gillis put it, with so 
many samples, “[i]t would take you hundreds of hours 
of work and hundreds of thousands of dollars to clear 
 
271 See id. 
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the rights to this album even if you wanted to.” Yet, Girl 
Talk’s business is not without harm. Both iTunes and a 
CD distributer refused to carry his most recent album, 
Night Ripper, because of legal concerns.272 
Here the excerpt explains that only an artist confident in a fair use 
defense would dare sample without a license.  Thus, if the courts allow 
for another defense in addition to the fair use test, courts may run the 
risk of encouraging more “Girl Talks” by labeling certain samples de 
minimis, harping back to the principle established in Holmes.273  
A. Possible Solutions  
The obvious solution to cure the circuit split is to follow the 
ruling of the Sixth Circuit, which would not bar fair use274 in sampling 
of sound recording disputes.275  If courts allowed only the fair use 
defense in sampling cases, samplers would become more creative in 
order to satisfy the fair use balancing test, which in turn would mean 
that their work would differ more significantly than that of a plaintiff.  
This could foster a robust environment for both copyright holders 
making new works without fear of being sampled and samplers 
working harder to ensure that their creation is a unique contribution to 
 
272 Lieberman, supra note 2, at 128-29 (footnotes omitted). 
273 Cf. Holmes, 2017 WL 1056398, at *3. 
274 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018) (emphasis added) on fair use, which provides: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of 
a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or 
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple 
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement 
of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any 
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of 
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;  
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;  
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and  
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar 
a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the 
above factors. 
275 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 805 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Since 
the district judge found no infringement, there was no necessity to consider the affirmative 
defense of ‘fair use.’  On remand, the trial judge is free to consider this defense and we express 
no opinion on its applicability to these facts.”). 
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society, which comports with Congress’s overall intent for creating the 
copyright system in the United States.276  
If Congress or the courts believe that a de minimis defense 
should remain for sampling cases, they should use a new test, “the 
removal test,”277 to better determine the substantiality of a sampling, 
abandoning the current average audience test.  The removal test would 
still determine substantial similarity by way of an average audience but 
with a significant change.  The average audience would not be asked 
to determine if it could tell the similarities between two works or parts 
of a work but rather if it could discern an appropriation at all.278  
Instead of trying to listen for the appropriation between the original 
work and new work, the new work would have the alleged 
appropriation removed, and then the factfinder would determine if she 
hears a difference from the new work with the appropriation versus the 
new work without it.  If a person could easily discern the difference, 
then the appropriation obviously added something of value to the 
work, and, thus, is substantial and should be protected.  
If this test had been applied in VGM, the court would have 
listened to Madonna’s song first with the horn hits, and then without, 
making the determination if the horn hits removal was “significant” 
enough to be noticed.  If the difference was noticeable, the 
appropriation was substantial; if not, the appropriation would be 
considered de minimis.279   
Thus, if the courts do not follow the ruling of the Sixth Circuit 
by adhering to a fair use defense, the courts that choose to apply the de 
minimis analysis to sampling cases should consider implementing the 
removal test.280 A determination of which option is best could only be 
determined if courts begin using the test.  
 
276 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
277 The name for this test was conceived by the author of this Note.  
278 See McGiverin, supra note 6, at 1736 n.77 (“As such, a line between substantial and de 
minimis taking might be drawn by imagining what a given song would sound like without the 
instrument in question.  While the bass line of a reggae song, for instance, is only one of 
several instruments, it is hard to imagine such a song without it.  Its inclusion would then be 
considered to constitute a substantial part of the recording of that song.”). 
279 See McGiverin, supra note 6, at 1736 n.77. 
280 The removal test could be used even if courts choose not to engage in a de minimis 
inquiry, as it could serve as an alternative determination of infringement.  Moreover, these 
courts could also apply the fair use defense because not all samples will be considered de 
minimis as a threshold matter. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Sixth Circuit’s discussion of the congressional intent from 
the 1970s as background for its interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 114(b)281 
was well reasoned because the need to curtail piracy in sound 
recordings was prevalent at the time Congress amended the Copyright 
Act.  Additionally, the statistics provided have shown282 that this 
problem seems only to be worsening.  Using this history as additional 
fodder for the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion, that even “small” sampling 
should not be allowed because it allows for “small” infringements or 
piracy,283 provides a rationale for this interpretation. 
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute is 
logically sound.  Through its robust reading of the statute, it was able 
to determine that Congress’s insertion of the word “entirely” into the 
statute meant that it was trying to further define the exclusive right of 
sound recordings by limiting copyright holders’ exclusive right to 
derivative works that were not entirely independent of sounds used 
from the holder’s sound recording.  This reasoning led the court to 
determine that a work containing a sample is a derivative work and is 
not entirely independent of the copyright holder’s sounds, and as such, 
a would-be sampler would need to get a license to create such a 
work.284  Further, the Sixth Circuit found that the substantial similarity 
test or inquiry was the wrong test to apply to cases involving the 
sampling of sound recordings.285 
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling is full of rationales 
and methods of analysis that raise many questions.  First, the Ninth 
Circuit’s reflexive approach to apply the same analysis to sound 
recordings as it does with musical compositions is questionable286 
without more considerations, such as the different interest in both types 
of works and that sampling is the act of creating a derivative work.  
Second, the Ninth Circuit’s plain meaning and legislative history 
analysis of 17 U.S.C. § 114 used debatable rationales and methods.  
 
281 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800 (6th Cir. 2005). 
282 See supra text accompanying notes 95-98. 
283 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800 (“That leads us directly to the issue in this case.  If you 
cannot pirate the whole sound recording, can you ‘lift’ or ‘sample’ something less than the 
whole.  Our answer to that question is in the negative.”). 
284 See generally id. 
285 See generally id. 
286 See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 878. 
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Lastly, its rationale to reject on-point precedent287 was based on the 
finding of a “fallacy” and an arguably questionable critique of the Sixth 
Circuit’s findings.  Thus, these reasons diminish VGM’s credibility as 
a case that should be relied upon by other courts facing the same issue.  
The possible effects that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling could have 
on the music industry, such as the potential massive losses in revenue 
for persons that buy and sell samples, and the advent of more infringers 
such as “Girl Talk” emerging, must not be forgotten.  By using a 
solution mentioned in this Note, these situations may be curtailed.  
Thus, the de minimis defense should be barred in cases that deal with 
sampling copyrighted sound recordings or the removal test should be 
adopted. 
 
287 Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (“The obligation 
to follow precedent begins with necessity, and a contrary necessity marks its outer limit.  With 
Cardozo, we recognize that no judicial system could do society’s work if it eyed each issue 
afresh in every case that raised it.”). 
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